In Jouini and Kallal 1995a, the authors characterized the absence of arbitrage opportunities for contingent claims with cash delivery in the presence of bid-ask spreads. Other authors obtained similar results for a more general de nition of the contingent claims but assuming some speci c price processes and transaction costs rather than bid-ask spreads in general see for instance, Cvitanic and Karatzas, 1996. The main di erence consists in the fact that the bid-ask ratio is constant in this last reference. This assumption does not permit to encompass situations where the prices are determined by the buying and selling limit orders or by a resp. competitive specialist resp. marketmakers. We derive in this paper some implications from the noarbitrage assumption on the price functionals that generalizes all the previous results in a very general setting. Indeed, under some minimal assumptions on the price functional, we prove that the prices of the contingent claims are necessarily in some minimal interval. This result opens the way t o m a n y empirical analyses.
Introduction
There is an important literature on the contingent claims pricing problem under transaction costs on the primitive assets. For instance, Leland 1985 studied the replication price for a contingent claim in a discrete time setting. In this paper, when the horizon is kept xed and the number N of time periods goes to in nity, the price of the primitive asset is assumed to converge to a di usion process. If we further assume that the transaction costs go to zero as the square root of N, Leland 1985 claims then that the replication price for a call option converges to the Black and Scholes price of this option in a model without transaction costs but with a correctly modi ed volatility for the primitive asset. For a correct proof of Leland's result see Kabanov 1997. In Boyle and Vorst 1992, the authors do not assume that the transaction costs go to zero and characterize the replication cost as an integral of the future prices relatively to a signed measure which is not, in general, a probability measure as in the frictionless model.
In 1992, Bensaid, Lesne, Pag es et Scheinkman revolutionize the transaction costs literature considering dominating strategies instead of replicating ones. Indeed, the authors note that the replication cost is not necessarily, a s in the transaction costless framework, the minimum cost necessary to obtain at least the same payo s as those of the considered contingent claim. They propose then, in a discrete time setting, an algorithm in order to compute the so called domination price : the minimum cost necessary to obtain at least the same payo s as those of the considered contingent claim. Furthermore, they characterize the situation where the replication price is equal to the domination price and where the replication strategy is in some sense optimal.
In the same year and after the seminal work of Bensaid, Lesne, Pag es et Scheinkman 1992, Jouini and Kallal characterize, in a paper published in 1995, this domination price in a general setting. They prove that this price is equal for a given contingent claim to the supremum of the future payo s expected value. This supremum is taken over all the equivalent martingale measures associated to one of the processes lying between the bid and the ask price processes. Furthermore they characterize the absence of arbitrage opportunities in the model by the existence of a process lying between the bid and the ask price processes and of an equivalent probability measure for which the considered process is a martingale.
More recently, Shirakawa and Konno 1995 in a stationary binomial framework, Kusuoka 1995 in a discrete time and nite number of states of the world framework and Cvitanic and Karatzas 1996 in a di usion setting, obtained results similar to some of Jouini and Kallal 1 1995a in a di erent setting. Indeed, in Jouini and Kallal 1995a, the authors only consider contingent claims with cash delivery. Note that this restriction is inocuous in the transaction costless framework but this is not at all the case in our framework.
Nevertheless, it is important to remark that in all these papers, the authors assume the existence of some price process S satisfying some classical conditions implying the absence of arbitrage opportunities in a frictionless framework di usion, binomial process.... The bid and the ask price processes are obtained multiplying S by 1 + and 1 , . In this setting, the transaction costs are proportional to the price S and the bid and ask price processes have the same behaviour. The Jouini and Kallal 1995a paper is the only one with two independent price processes : a bid price process and an ask price process. The bid-ask spread can beinterpreted as transaction costs but can be explained by the buying and selling limit orders on the markets. These prices are the prices for which a buyer or a seller is sure to nd an immediate counterpart. From this point of view the bid-ask spread includes the possible transaction costs but is not reduced to these costs. With this interpretation we can not assume that the relative bid-ask spread is constant. Indeed, Hamon and Jacquillat 1992 established in an empirical study that the relative bid-ask spread can typically be multiplied by 3 on the same year and by 2 during the same day. Furthermore, it appears that the relative bid-ask spread is positively correlated to the volatility of the security with a coe cient near to 0.5. These results are not compatible with the previous references.
Jouini and Kallal 1995a proved that the absence of arbitrage opportunities is equivalent to the existence of a frictionless arbitrage free process i.e. a process which could be transformed into a martingale under a well chosen probability measure lying between the bid and the ask price processes. Consequently, all the models with constant proportional transaction 1 For instance, Cvitanic and Karatzas do not characterize the absence of arbitrage opportunities but only the domination price. Indeed, the choice of a di usion framework implies the absence of arbitrage opportunities.
costs applied to some frictionless arbitrage-free price process S, are obviously arbitrage-free. The converse is false and if a model with constant proportional transaction costs applied to some price process S is arbitrage-free then S is not necessarily a frictionless arbitrage-free process.
In a recent paper, Koehl, Pham and Touzi 1996 consider, in a discrete time framework, such a model with proportional transaction costs but without any speci c assumption on S. Nevertheless they assume that the absence of arbitrage opportunities assumption is satis ed even with a little bit smaller bid-ask spread. But if this bid-ask spread is the result of all the buying and selling limit orders in a market with competitive market-makers as on the MONEP, Paris and not by a monopolistic specialist as on the NYSE, then it seems natural to assume that the bid-ask spread is in some sense minimal. The only reason for which the bid-ask spread is not smaller appears then as the existence of arbitrage opportunities for little bit smaller bid-ask spreads. The condition imposed by Koehl, Pham and Touzi 1996 is then not so inocuous.
In the present paper, we consider a model a la Jouini and Kallal 1995a for the description of the primitive assets. We prove in this setting, that the valuation formula obtained by Jouini and Kallal 1995a for derivative assets with cash delivery extends for general derivative assets. This extension is important because on the markets, the traded contracts can impose cash delivery but also asset delivery or can let the choice to the derivative's holder and the domination price in these three situations is not the same at all as shown on some examples by Bensaid, Lesne, Pag es and Scheinkman 1992. This result is obtained as a corollary of Jouini and Kallal 1995a result and generalizes Cvitanic and Karatzas 1996 result. Indeed, our result is obtained under an absence of arbitrage opportunities assumption obviously satis ed in Cvitanic and Karatzas 1996 weaker than the classical analogous assumption in the continuous time models since we only consider simple strategies rather than general continuous time strategies. Our set of strategies is then smaller and the absence of strategies leading to an arbitrage a w eaker assumption.
Our approach is an axiomatic one and constitutes a methodological innovation. Indeed, we shall rst introduce the minimal assumptions for a price functional in order to be admissible. Then, we will prove that such an admissible price functional necessarily lies between the supremum and the in mum of the previously de ned expected values. Furthermore, these maximum and minimum appear as admissible bis-ask prices. Our approach is now used in some posterior papers like in Koehl and Pham 1997 .
From an economic point of view our result has many di erent interpretations.
First, our result can be seen as a necessary relation satis ed at the equilibrium and then under the absence of arbitrage opportunities condition by the primitive assets prices and the derivative assets prices. Our result is then particularly useful for econometricians who typically restrict their attention to a small number of traded securities either because of data availability o r for tractability reasons and work out the implications of the data they have collected on them. Assuming the absence of arbitrage opportunities, a set of state price densities compatible with the data in our framework, a set of martingale measures can be derived. From there, it is possible to compute, for instance, the bounds on the mean and variance of the state prices, as in Hansen and Jagannathan 1991 in a frictionless setup and provide common diagnostic for a whole class of models. How to take into account the transaction costs in such an analysis is upto now a discussed question and we can refer to Rubinstein 1994 and Jackwerth and Rubinstein 1996 for a discussion of this point.
Second, if we consider a model in which w e i n troduce regularly new standardized assets for instance, 3 months calls at the money each trimester, we can assume that the introduction of these new assets is completely anticipated by the market and then that the introduction of these new assets will not modify signi cantly the trend or the volatility of the primitive assets price processes. The no-arbitrage condition implies then that the price of the new asset has to be between our bounds.
Third, if we keep in mind that an important part of the transactions on the derivative assets are over the counter, it seems reasonable in that case to think that the introduction of a new asset discussed between only two individuals and designed by one of them in order to satisfy particular needs of the other one will not modify the fundamentals of the economy. The unique rule for the seller is then to x a price below the buyer's manufacturing cost.
Fourth, assuming that we are at the equilibrium before the introduction of the new assets, Jouini and Kallal 1996 proved that our bounds de ne the tightest bid-ask interval for the new asset for which a new equilibrium can befound without any modi cation of the other asset prices.
The model
Let ; F; P bea probability space, X = L 2 ; F; P the space of square integrable random variables on ; F; P ; that we assume to be separable.
In fact, X is the space of classes of random variables that coincide almost everywhere. If B 2 F, we denote by 1 B the element of X equal to 1 on B and to 0 elsewhere. Let~ be the space equal to f 0; : : : ; K g endowed with F;P the natural probability structure de ned by F; P . LetX be the set de ned byX = L 2 ~ ;F;P. The setX can be identi ed with X K+1 .
LetX + bethe set of random variables x 2X such thatP x 0 = 1 and Px 0 0. A linear functional onX is said to bepositive if x 0 for all x 2X such thatP x 0 = 1 and x 0 for all x 2X + .
We consider a multiperiod economy where agents can trade a nite numberof securities at all dates t 2 T , with T 0; T . Although we impose a nite horizon there is no other restriction on market timing: our framework includes discrete as well as continuous time models. Without loss of generality w e shall assume that agents can trade at the initial and the nal date, i.e. f0; T g T . Each security k;with k = 0; : : : ; K ; can bebought for its ask price Z k t and can be sold for its bid price Z 0 k t at any time t 2 T : A right-continuous 2 ltration fF t g t2T models the information structure of our economy, where the -algebra F t represents the information available to agents at date t:We also make Assumption P : i Z k and Z 0 k are right-continuous and adapted to fF t g t2T , for all k = 0 ; : : : ; K , ii EZ k 2 t 1 and EZ 0 k 2 t 1 for all t 2 T and k = 0 ; : : : ; K , iii Z k Z 0 k 0 for all t and for almost all ! iv Z 0 and Z 0 0 are constant equal to 1. Assumption i says that the bid and the ask prices of traded securities belong to the information set available to agents. For convenience, we shall also assume that F 0 is the trivial -algebra, and that F T = F. Assumption ii is technical. Assumption iii means that all the prices remain positive and that the buying price is greater than or equal to the selling price. This last condition is obviously satis ed under the no-arbitrage condition and can 2 I.e. for all t 2 0; T ; F t is the intersection of the -algebras F s ; where s t : This assumption, as well as the right-continuity of the bid-ask price processes, are not necessary if there are no transaction costs at the nal date i.e if ZT =Z 0 T a.e.. then bedropped without any loss. The last assumption means that there is no transaction costs on the cash. It is easy to relax the equality to 1 dividing all the prices by Z 0 . A contingent claim is then de ned by the contingent traded securities quantities delivered at the nal date.
De nition 1 A contingent claim C is de ned by C 0 ; : : : ; C K 2 X K+1 the contingent portfolio guaranted by C.
This de nition of a contingent claim permits us to consider, for instance, call options with asset delivery. In this last case C i =1 S i K and C 0 = ,K1 S i K if the primitive asset is the i th one. Furthermore it is easy to see that one contingent unit of a given asset has not the same e ect on the agent's portfolio than the "equivalent" amount in fact, we can not de ne the equivalent amount at all since the buying and the selling prices di er. There is many other situations, where the derivative asset can not be described by a contingent amount but by a contingent portfolio like in the Notional loan where we have to deliver at the due date the less costly bond in some given basket. Furthermore, since the considered ltration is in general the ltration generated by the price processes, all contingent claims can be expressed as random functions of assets and our de nition permits then to encompass the most general situations.
A price functional in this setting is a function p de ned on the contingent claims space X K+1 and which takes its values in R f1g where pC represents the price at which the contingent claim C can be bought. The following conditions characterize the admissible price functionals.
Axiom 1 the price functional p is a sublinear form i.e. for all pair C;C 0 of elements of X K+1 and for all nonnegative real number we have pC + C 0 pC + pC 0 and pC = pC
This means that it is less expensive to buy the sum C + C 0 of two contingent claims than to buy the claims C and C 0 separately and add up the prices. It is easy to see why i f w e think in terms of hedging costs: the sum of two strategies that hedge the claims C and C 0 hedges the claim C + C 0 but some orders to buy and sell the same security at the same date might cancel out. Some of the transaction costs might b e saved this way. But even if the price di ers from the hedging cost our assumption seems to be satis ed in the real world and it is well known, for instance, that the theoretical Call-Put parity obtained under a linearity assumption on the price functionals is not satis ed in general. In particular our condition implies that the buying price pC is greater than or equal to th selling price ,p,C . The multiplicative condition seems to be less natural but is assumed in all the classical nancial market models. Furthermore, the multiplicative e ect is not clear since the price is in uenced by two diametrically opposed e ects : increasing returns to scale possibility to obtain better prices from the broker for large quantities and exhaustion of the best bid and ask o ers which implies a greater bid-ask spread and decreasing returns to scale. Without further informations on the relative size of these e ects, the assumption pC = pC seems to be acceptable. This assumption is compatible with the sublinearity one and seems to be satis ed in the real world for reasonable values of :
Axiom 2 the price functional p is lower semi-continuous i.e. I f a s e quence C n converges to C in X K+1 and if pC n converges to then pC This assuption is not only a technical one but is also a natural one. Indeed if some payo s arbitrarily close to the payo C can beobtained at a price lower to some given price, it seems to beobvious that no one will accept to pay more than this given price to obtain C. The lower semi-continuity of p is then a classical consequence of this property.
Axiom 3 the pricing functional p induces no arbitrage i.e. if C 2X + then pC 0 This assumption is a classical one and we can remark that this formulation is the weaker one. Indeed, our assumption concerns the absence of arbitrage opportunities under the price p in a static setting and not the absence of free lunches in a dynamic setting. Furthermore, in general, free-lunches are de ned as limits and here we have no such complicated construction.
In order to introduce our last condition on p we have to describe more precisely the strategy space of the agents. In fact and even in a model with a continuous resolution of uncertainty, it seems to be more realistic to assume that the agents do not trade at each date but only on a nite set of dates as in Harrison and Kreps 1979 . This set is choosen by the agents and depends on the strategy choice.
The set of admissible strategies in our framework is then smaller than the admissible strategies set in Harrison Since the bid and the ask prices possibly di er, we separate strategies in a long cumulative component and in a short cumulative component 0 ; i.e. k t is the total quantity of the kth security bought up to time t and 0 k t is the total quantity sold up to time t: Hence, k t , 0 k t is the amount of the kth security owned at time t: Assumption i says that consumers can trade only on current and past information. Assumption ii translates the fact that and 0 are cumulative long and short positions. Assumption iii is technical. Assumption iv says that any given strategy must have a nite but arbitrarily large number of trading dates decided in advance at date 0.We assume here that trading dates are decided in advance. It is possible, however, to let trading dates bestopping times and impose only their number to be decided in advance. Note that when we are concerned by the characterization of the absence of arbitrage opportunities, the assumption iv restricts the set of strategies and for a same conclusion, a result obtained under iv is stronger than a result obtained without iv.
Agents are assumed not to have external sources of nancing, and since they consume only at dates 0 and T they must sell or short some securities in order to purchase others at intermediary dates. Hence, we de ne selfnancing strategies as the admissible in the sense of the budget constraints strategies.
De nition 3 A simple strategy ; 0 is self-nancing if for n = 1; : : : ; N we have t n , t n,1 Zt n 0 t n , 0 t n,1 Z 0 t n :
This means that at every trading date after the initial date the value of the securities that are bought is less than or equal to the value of the securities that are sold: in other words sales must nance purchases. The set of simple self-nancing strategies is denoted by . It turns out that the set of simple self-nancing trading strategies is stable by addition and multiplication by a nonnegative scalar, i.e. it is a convex cone of the space of simple strategies.
A strategy ; 0 2 costs 0 Z0 , 0 0 Z 0 0 units of date 0 consumption, and provides k , 0 k T units of securiry k at date T. We have already seen that, when there are transaction costs it is not true that the cheapest way to obtain a given minimal contingent payo at date T is to duplicate it by dynamic trading. This fact has been pointed out by Bensaid and al. 1992 in a discrete time and states framework. A simple example can illustrate it. Assume that a call option on a stock is to be hedged using a riskless bond and the underlying stock only. Also suppose that there are transaction costs in trading the stock at intermediate dates between now and maturity. It is then easy to see that if transaction costs are prohibitively high it is cheaper to buy the stock and hold it until maturity which leads to a payo that is strictly larger than the payo of the call than to try to duplicate the call. In fact, the same conclusion is obtained in 1995 by Dubourg 1997 , Leventhal and Skorohod 1995 and Soner, Shreve and Cvitanic 1995 in continuous time models even with small transaction cost. Hence, we shall consider the price functional de ned for every claim C 2 X K+1 by C = inff0 Z0 , 0 0 Z 0 0g : ; 0 2 and , 0 T Cg:
In words, C represents the in mum cost necessary to get at least the nal contingent portfolio C at date T. Note that a contingent claim C is not necessarily attainable or at least dominable by a strategy belonging to . In this case, we have C = 1. Note that is not de ned as in Jouini and Kallal 1995a taking limits and inf-limits but directly from the dominating strategies set.
We can now introduce our last condition :
Axiom 4 For all C 2 X K+1 , we have pC C
This assumption is only a monotonicity assumption. We impose that if it is possible to obtain a better payo than C at a cost C then no one will accept to pay more than C in order to obtain C. Remark that even if C is duplicable and if its duplication cost is the minimum cost necessary to obtain at least the same payo we do not impose pC = C. In particular, if C is the k-th traded security we have C = Z k T 3 and we do not impose pC = C. Indeed, C and ,,C can be interpreted as the best prices proposed by the market-makers. It is obvious then that transactions can occur at both prices. Furthermore, no agent will accept to pay more than C in order to receive C or to receive less than ,,C if he sells C. Nevertheless, a buyer and a seller can accept any intermediary price. Consequently, the price at which a transaction will occur is not necessarily one of the bounds imposed by the market-makers but can be any price between these bounds. Furthermore, it is easy to see that if the new asset is introduced on the market at a buying price greater than C and a selling price smaller than ,,C then anyone will buy or sell this asset and the equilibrium prices and allocation will not bemodi ed. Consequently, if we w ant to introduce this new asset and if we want to see it traded by some agent, it seems to be reasonable to look for a buying or a selling price in our intervall.
We are now in a position to state our main result :
Theorem 1 i There exists at least one admissible price functional p if and only if there exists at least a probability measure P equivalent to P i.e. P and P have exactly the same zero measure sets with E dP dP 2 1 and a process Z satisfying, for all t, Z 0 t Z t Zt, a.e., such that E dP dP Z T 2 1 and Z is a martingale with respect to the ltration fF t g and the probability measure P .
ii If p satis es conditions A-1 to A-4 then for all contingent claim C we have pC 2 inf E C Z T ; sup E C Z T = ,p ,C; p C where the in mum and the supremum are taken over all the expectation operators E associated to a probability measure P and all the processes Z 3 In fact in order to have C = Z k T we have to impose also that the considered security can not be dominated by a combination of the others. This is, in particular, true under some independence conditions on the traded assets such that P ; Z satisfy the conditions of i. Furthermore the functional p de ned a s a b ove satis es conditions A-1 to A-4 and is then an admissible price functional.
In order to prove the main result we have to introduce the function de ned as follows and to establish the following lemma, C = infflim inf n f n 0Z0, 0 n 0Z 0 0g : n ; 0 n 2 ; n , 0 n T C n ; C n ! Cg.
In wordsC represents the in mum cost necessary to get at least a nal contingent portfolio arbitrarily close to C at date T.
Lemma 2 The functionals and are sublinear and is the largest l.s.c.
functional that lies below .
Proof of the Lemma : If we remark that is a convex cone, it is relatively easy to prove that is a sublinear functional and by a limit argument that is also a sublinear functional. Let M be the set de ned by fx 2 X :x 1g.
Let 2 R and C n be a sequence in M converging to C 2 M such thatC n , for all n. Then, by a diagonal extraction process, there exist a sequenceC n and a sequence n ; 0 n 2 such that kC n , C n k 1 n , n , 0 n T C n and n 0 Z0 , 0 n 0 Z 0 0 + 1 n . SinceC n converges to C we must then have, by de nition of,C . Hence, the set fC 2 M :C g is closed and is l.s.c.
Let C n bea sequence of elements of X K+1 converging to a claim C and let n ; 0 n bea sequence of strategies in such that n , 0 n T C n . It is clear that n 0 Z0 , 0 n 0 Z 0 0 C n and consequentlyC infflim inf n C n : C n ! Cg. Moreover it is clear thatC C for all C 2 X K+1 . Since is l.s.c. we must haveC infflim inf n C n : C n ! Cg which implies thatC infflim inf n C n : C n ! Cg. Consequently,C = infflim inf n C n : C n ! Cg. An analogous argument gives, for every l.s.c. functional f : X K+1 ! R such that f , that fC infflim inf n C n : C n ! Cg and hence, f . Proof of the Theorem : First, let P be a probability measure equivalent to P and let Z , with Z 0 Z Z, be a martingale with respect to P and fF t g. De ne the linear functional p by pC = E Z T C for all C 2 X K+1 . Since Z T = dP dP Z T 2 X we h a ve that pC = E Z T C = E Z T C is continuous. Since P and P are equivalent, it is easy to see that p is positive. The price functional p satis es then assumption A-1 to A-3.
Let C 2 X K+1 and let ; 0 2 with trading dates 0 = t 0 t 1 : : : t N = T ;such that , 0 T C. Since Z 0 Z Z and ; 0 is nondecreasing and self-nancing, we have, for n = 1 ; : : : ; N , E t n , t n,1 Z t n , 0 t n , 0 t n,1 Z t n j F t n,1 E t n , t n,1 Zt n , 0 t n , 0 t n,1 Z 0 t n j F t n,1 0: Using the fact that Z is a martingale with respect to fF t g and P , w e h a ve E , 0 t n Z t n j F t n,1 E , 0 t n,1 Z t n j F t n,1 , 0 t n,1 Z t n,1 : By iteration, E , 0 T Z T , 0 0 Z 0 0 Z0 , 0 0 Z 0 0: Furthermore, by de nition of p we h a ve pC = E Z T C E , 0 T Z T . Hence, pC 0 Z0 , 0 0 Z 0 0 and taking the in mum over the strategies ; 0 2 such that , 0 T C; we obtain that pC = E C C for all C 2 X K+1 and p satis es also the condition A-4.
Assume now that there exists at least one admissible price functional. Following Jouini and Kallal 1995a, de nition 2.1, we will call a free lunch inX a sequence of real numbers r n that converges to some r 0, a sequence x n inX that converges to some x 0 such that r + x 2X + , and a sequence of claims C n such that C n x n and r n + C n 0 4 , for all n. We have then the following result : Lemma 3 If there exists at least one admissible price functional then there is no free-lunch.
Proof : Consider a free lunch as de ned above. We have x n 2X and r n +x n 0. If r 0 and since is l.s.c., we have thenx 0. Recalling that p is l.s.c. and that is the largest l.s.c. functional that lies below , w e h a ve px 0 with x 2X + which constitutes an arbitrage.
Then, by assumption A-3 there is no free lunch. 4 Note that our functions and are denoted respectively bỹ and in the mentioned reference Remark : If there is no free-lunches then = p . This is a direct result of Jouini and Kallal 1995 but can also be proved directly using the Theorem and Lemma 1. Indeed, it is easy to see that satis es assumptions A-1, A-2 and A-4 and if there is no free-lunches then A-3 is also satis ed.
We have thenC sup p C and since is the largest l.s.c. functional that lies below the converse inequality holds. When there is free-lunches then, following Jouini and Kallal 1995a, there does not exist "martingalemeasures" and p is not de ned.
Assume now that there is no arbitrage and consequently that there is no free lunch de ned as above. Let us consider M be the subset ofX de ned by M = fm 2X :m 1g and let us denote by~ the set of positive linear forms onX. Consider 2~ such that j M ;as guaranteed by Jouini and Kallal 1995a, Theorem 2.1 under the no free-lunch condition. Since is continuous, by the Riesz representation Theorem there exists a random variable 2X such that x = E x, for all x 2X or equivalently there exists 0 ; : : : ; K in X K+1 such that C = E C, for all C 2 X K+1 . De ne P from by P B = E 0 1 B for all B 2 F . By linearity and strict positivity o f it is clear that P is a measure equivalent t o P. Using the fact that Z 0 = Z 0 Let k 2 f1; : : : ; K g, t 2 T and B 2 F t . Let C the contingent claim de ned by C k = 1 B , C 0 = ,Z k t1 B and C h = 0 for h 6 = 0 ; k . The contingent claim C is duplicable. It su ces to buy at t, if ! 2 B, one unit of the security k and to pay with security 0 units. This strategy costs nothing and we have then E ,Z k t + k = 0 1 B = E, 0 Z k t + k 1 B = C C C 0. Then, we have E k = 0 1 B E Z k t1 B , for all t and all B 2 F t . This implies that Z k Z k . By a symetric argument we obtain Z k Z 0 k . Furthermore, by construction, dP dP Z T is square integrable which achieves to prove the point i of the theorem.
In fact, we h a ve also proved that every 2~ such that j M is equal to E C Z for some process Z between Z 0 and Z and some probability measure P such that Z is a martingale relatively to P and conversely.
Following Jouini and Kallal 1995a, Theorem 2.2,C = supC where the supremum is taken over all the functionals 2~ such that j M . Consequently, if p is an admissible price functional, by A-1, A-2 and A-4 we have that p and applying this result to C and ,C for a given C inX, we obtain pC 2 inf E C Z T ; sup E C Z T where the in mum and the supremum are taken over all the expectation operators E associated to a probability measure P and all the processes Z such that P ; Z satisfy the conditions of i.
Since p satis es conditions A-1 to A-4, this achieves the proof of the Theorem.
